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Foucault’s Analytics of Sovereignty 
 
Abstract: The classical theory of sovereignty describes sovereignty as absolute and 
undivided yet no early modern state could claim such features. Historical record instead 
suggests that sovereignty was always divided and contested. In this article I argue that 
Foucault offers a competing account of sovereignty that underlines such features and is thus 
more historically apt. While commentators typically assume that Foucault’s understanding 
of sovereignty is borrowed from the classical theory, I demonstrate instead that he offers a 
sui generis interpretation, which results from the application of his general strategic 
conception of power to sovereignty itself. In construing sovereignty through a “matrix” of 
civil war, Foucault thus deprives it of the absoluteness traditionally attributed to it. Instead 
he views sovereignty as constituted by conflictual and mobile power relations, a precarious 
political technology that deploys violence to restore its authority. I also motivate Foucault’s 
contention that popular sovereignty remains fundamentally continuous with the absolutist 
sovereignty it succeeds, insofar as it masks and thereby perpetuates unequal power relations 
in conditions of social conflict. According to Foucault, sovereignty is not a fact of power but 
a contestory claim, a discourse whose mutability helps to explain its persistence today.  
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Introduction 
A peculiarity of the classical theory of sovereignty is its failure to correspond to historical record. 
This theory describes sovereignty as absolute and undivided, yet no early modern monarch or state 
could claim such attributes. The classical theory was, in fact, a response to the very precariousness 
and dividedness of political power. Thus it was the devastating French Wars of Religion that 
motivated the first systematic account of sovereignty, provided by Jean Bodin. For Bodin, the 
resolution to the Wars required that all secular and religious authority be concentrated in one, 
indivisible power; it was the very distribution of this authority between multiple powers that fueled 
the conflict.1 Seventy years later, Hobbes penned his own defense of absolute sovereignty in the 
immediate aftermath of the English Civil War. Hobbes believed that this war was attributable in 
 1 
large part to the division of sovereignty between king and parliament; the only political solution 
was to vest all authority in a single Leviathan.2 Finally, in addition to such religious and political 
conflict, early modernity also oversaw massive social conflict: the state was consistently 
destabilized by peasant and nascent bourgeois classes alike.3 Hence the theory of sovereignty was 
less description than political project, less transcription of fact than philosophical dream of stability 
in turbulent times. Of Hobbes, J. M. Bernstein has written “By 1648, even before it was penned, 
the Hobbesian conception of an undivided and absolutely authoritative sovereign whose laws are 
commands was already a backward-looking fantasy.”4 We might just stress that it was even more 
fantasy than backward-looking, as the project of an absolutely authoritative sovereignty had at no 
point been truly realized.5 
 Such observations complicate the widespread consensus that in the late modern era, 
sovereignty is on the wane.6 Of course, this consensus cannot be entirely wrong. Over recent 
decades, global economic and political forces have rendered the idea of national—or at least 
classical, Westphalian—sovereignty all but anachronistic. Yet one wonders if the consensus 
doesn’t sometimes take the “backward-looking fantasy” of Hobbes or Bodin less as fantasy and 
more as historical fact; if it doesn’t sometimes consider the model of an undivided sovereignty,  
threatened neither from within nor without, as more of a historical reality than it ever was. For the 
“waning” of sovereignty would seem to imply a period in which sovereignty existed in its fullness, 
in all its undivided power.7 The characterization of sovereignty as an anachronistic concept entails 
a period in which it was historically apt. But if this period is a myth, conjured up in part by 
philosophers, then how ought sovereignty be conceived at all? If the classical theory itself is in 
some sense fictional, what would a non-fictional theory look like? If sovereignty is from the 
beginning not absolute but rather, as the historical record suggests, divided, contested, and 
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besieged, then how should we revise the theory of Bodin and Hobbes? Or else, where can we find 
an account of sovereignty qua always-already divided and defensive? 
 It is my contention that we can find such an account in the work of Foucault. This 
contention may at first be surprising, given Foucault’s notorious aversion to the “juridico-political” 
frameworks employed in classical theories of sovereignty, and given his call to “cut off the head 
of the king” in political thought.8 Yet while Foucault believed that power often functioned through 
modalities other than that of sovereignty, he maintained that it functioned through an irreducibly 
sovereign modality, too. I seek to argue that Foucault did not, however, merely adopt and replicate 
the classical model of sovereignty (as many commentators assume), but instead developed a sui 
generis account of it.9 Thus, beside and in addition to his novel formulations of disciplinary and 
governmental power, Foucault ultimately offered his own original account of sovereign power. 
This account is foremost strategic and conflictual. It conceives sovereignty not as the political 
body formed with the conclusion of the war of all against all (as in Hobbes), but instead, as a mode 
of power that strategically operates during war, a war-like or contested and contestory power. It is 
for this reason that Foucault’s notorious inversion of Clausewitz can be applied to sovereignty: not 
just politics, but also sovereignty is the continuation of war by other means.10 Constitutively 
precarious, beset by contestation, sovereignty is never fact, but only claim.11 The aim of this paper 
is to elaborate this strategic analytics of sovereignty. 
 I begin by reconstructing Foucault’s understanding and critique of the classical theory of 
sovereignty, before motivating the alternative, strategic conception of sovereign power he 
proposes in its place. In the following section, I apply this conception to a reading of Discipline & 
Punish, to illustrate the sui generis account of sovereignty employed therein. I conclude by arguing 
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that this account’s applicability to both absolutist and popular modalities of sovereignty sheds light 
on the latter’s persistence and tenacity as a modern political discourse. 
 
The Classical Theory of Sovereignty 
Foucault’s primary contribution to political thought is rightly conceived as the theorization of 
modes of power irreducible to sovereignty or the state. In concepts such as discipline, government, 
security, and biopolitics, he proposed logics of power that were instead dispersed through the 
social body, linked perhaps to the state, but expressing their own immanent rationality. These 
concepts referred foremost to modern political developments. While the precise chronology differs 
for each, they generally isolate novel political technologies that emerged sometime from the end 
of the eighteenth century through the nineteenth century. This point has often been interpreted as 
entailing that the older technology of sovereignty disappears altogether in modernity, or else 
becomes largely obsolete or anachronistic. A common reading thus holds that for Foucault, 
modernity is defined by the wholesale replacement of sovereignty by discipline and government. 
This reading isn’t entirely wrong; Foucault certainly believes that modernity witnesses the waning 
of sovereignty. Yet he repeatedly emphasizes that so sovereignty persists, if in altered form. One 
way he articulates this persistence is with the metaphor of a triangle of technologies of power: “So 
we should not see things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a society of discipline, 
and then a society of discipline by a society, say, of government. In fact we have a triangle: 
sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management.”12 Accordingly, sovereignty comes to 
coexist with other modes of power. These other modes do not displace the former but instead 
merely alter or modernize it. Hence, while the sovereignty of the twentieth century may not 
function exactly as did that of the seventeenth, it nonetheless remains irreducible to these later 
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technologies. The result might then be characterized as a society of government and discipline and 
sovereignty. 
 Once we grant that sovereignty persists, it becomes a pressing task to say what exactly 
Foucault means by the term. We are familiar with his penetrating studies of discipline and 
government. Yet Foucault’s discussions of sovereignty are by comparison remarkably concise. 
This is no doubt due to the fact that Foucault rarely took sovereignty as his primary object of 
analysis. Hence his discussions of it typically served the purpose of mere foil for the explication 
of other technologies of power. Foucault repeatedly cites the “juridical-political theory of 
sovereignty,” but in doing so he is often less interested in the theory itself, and more interested in 
generating a contrast by which the features of, for example, discipline are thrown into greater 
relief. In fact, Foucault typically represents himself as merely recapitulating the classical theory of 
sovereignty without amendment. While it remains unclear whose classical theory he is actually 
reconstructing—Bodin’s? Hobbes’s?—Foucault apparently takes his comments to be generally 
valid across the entire genre. As such comments are Foucault’s most direct treatment of 
sovereignty, they nonetheless provide the best place to start in a reconstruction of his own views.  
 Accordingly, the most significant feature of the juridical-political theory of sovereignty for 
Foucault is its legal construal of power. For Foucault, this theory holds that law is the “very form 
of power.”13 I take it that this statement entails at least two slightly different ideas. The first is that 
law is the primary instrument of sovereignty. Accordingly, the maintenance and expansion of 
sovereign power is achieved through the instrumental use of law. The field of application for 
sovereignty is thus given in the division between legality and illegality. All forms of submission 
are reducible to obedience, while obedience is construed exclusively as obedience to the law. 
Power is thus limited to the punishment of legal transgression. It is essentially negative and 
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repressive. It does not produce docile bodies (as in discipline) or regulate life (as in biopolitics) or 
conduct the conduct of men (as in government), but merely prohibits. Sovereign power foremost 
posits a “law of interdiction,” and is guaranteed by the threat of legal punishment.14 As Alan Hunt 
has noted, Foucault here invokes an imperative conception of law: law is just “the commands of 
the sovereign backed by sanctions.”15 While in other work Foucault theorizes a more 
comprehensive set of legal and juridical mechanisms irreducible to criminal law, he seems to hold 
that the classical theory recognizes only the imperative conception.16 Following from this 
imperative conception, we may also attribute to Foucault a traditional conception of organ 
sovereignty, as it is only from a unified sovereign “organ” (such as the monarch) that such 
imperatives may issue.17  
 The other idea entailed by the statement that law is the very form of power is that law 
comes to discursively represent the sovereign. This is signaled, firstly, in Foucault’s further use of 
the term “juridico-discursive” to label the classical theory (and its modern applications). For 
Foucault, law was thus not only an instrument of power, but further a discourse or “language of 
power”; it was “the monarchic system’s mode of manifestation and the form of its acceptability.”18 
Thus, beyond the mere instrumental employment of law for the ends of obedience, sovereignty 
employs a legitimating discourse of law, in which law comes to “code” and legitimate its own 
exercise.19 In this discourse, the will of the sovereign is thereby made equivalent to law, becoming 
“legislative power” as such.20 It is accordingly in the manifestation of law that the authority of 
sovereignty is performed. Sovereignty is not silent, but rather verbose and theatrical. As suggested 
by Hobbes, it inspires awe—and obedience—through terror.21 (For Foucault, public torture is the 
paradigmatic example of sovereignty’s theatricality, and will be discussed below.) 
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 I take it that Foucault's discussion of the juridico-political theory of sovereignty is intended 
to more or less accurately represent the classical theory as such. I also take it that Foucault at least 
partially endorses it; in various places he suggests that it accurately, if not exhaustively, describes 
power as it functioned under the great monarchies of the late Middle Ages.22 Accordingly, as a 
first pass over a reconstruction of Foucault’s own theory of sovereignty, it would not be inaccurate 
to claim that he views it foremost as functioning through (1) the instrumental deployment of law 
and (2) the performance of a discourse of law. 
 Yet one must further ask if Foucault endorses it as wholly adequate to the actual functioning 
of sovereign power, whether historical or contemporary. While his recapitulations of the classical 
theory are often followed by criticisms of it, the latter typically only take issue with its extension 
to non-sovereign forms of power. Are such recapitulations of the classical theory thus his final 
word on the subject? Are Foucault’s innovations in the study of power limited to the field outside 
of sovereignty? That they are not can be seen in the fact that on two further occasions, thus far not 
considered, Foucault substantively engaged with not just the theory of sovereignty, but rather 
Hobbes’s theory. These occasions are Foucault’s 1973 and 1976 Collège de France lecture 
courses.23 While often read as merely a commentary on Hobbes, I shall instead read these lectures 
as a commentary on the Hobbesian—and thus classical—theory of sovereignty, with important 
implications for how we understand Foucault’s own approach to sovereignty. Taken together, the 
lecture courses provide the clearest available view on the latter’s decisive departure from the 
classical model. Foucault develops therein a sustained critique of a central premise of Hobbes’s 
theory, and thereby marks the novelty of his own. 
 The premise that Foucault is foremost concerned with critiquing may be called the 
conceptual incompatibility of sovereignty and war. As Foucault summarizes in his 1973 Punitive 
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Society lectures, sovereignty, for Hobbes, is negatively defined by war. Sovereignty is ultimately 
the result of the cessation of the war of all against all, expressed in the founding moment of the 
unification of all wills in the single sovereign, and in the disavowal and transfer of natural rights 
to the body of the Leviathan. Thus the founding of sovereignty itself ends the war of all against 
all. Because sovereignty is constituted with the disavowal of the natural rights of its subjects, any 
instances of the war of all against all, in which such natural rights are instead avowed and acted 
on, renders sovereignty inoperative. As long as the war of all against all continues, so sovereignty 
remains as yet unconstituted.  
 The same incompatibility defines the relationship between sovereignty and civil war. 
According to Foucault’s interpretation, civil war, for Hobbes, is merely “a historically determinate 
case of the resurgence of the war of all against all.”24 Like the war of all against all, civil war is 
foremost characterized by the absence of political authority and the concomitant license to use 
force for the protection of life; its difference from the war of all against all lies merely in the fact 
that it succeeds the commonwealth. As civil war progressively undermines the authority of the 
sovereign, so it represents a “dissolution” of the commonwealth, a state of affairs in which 
individuals regain the rights previously transferred to the sovereign, and the sovereign thereby 
“expires.”25 As long as war is kept beyond the boundaries of the commonwealth, the integrity of 
the sovereign is maintained. Yet the introduction of civil war rapidly undermines it. The conceptual 
incompatibility of sovereignty and war thus proposes to understand the two as separated by hard 
boundaries; passage from one to the other, or from the other and back again, is an always present 
possibility. Yet passage from one to the other entails leaving the first behind. No political 
community can exist, or exist for long, simultaneously in both. Construed as absolute legislative 
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power, sovereignty conceptually requires the suspension of the civil war in which this power goes 
unrecognized.  
 In his 1976 lectures, “Society Must Be Defended”, Foucault considers a further implication 
of Hobbes’s approach, namely, that sovereignty is always and everywhere necessarily legitimate.26 
This implication ultimately contrasts with the common view that Hobbes is a pre-eminent theorist 
not of peace and legitimacy, but of war and domination. Foucault contests this view, arguing 
instead that Hobbes’s construal of the constitution of sovereignty systematically erases the war 
that precedes it. Accordingly, even cases of what Hobbes calls sovereignty by acquisition—cases 
of military conquest or occupation—are ultimately legitimate. This is because in such cases, 
subjects may be seen to freely and willingly submit to the new authority, because they could always 
instead have chosen death over obedience. Quentin Skinner has shown that this perhaps curious 
view ultimately follows from Hobbes’ conception of liberty. For Hobbes, liberty is construed 
negatively vis-à-vis external constraints; one is free so long as one is not physically impeded, while 
even fear of death is not a physical impediment.27 The act of free, willing submission—which 
parallels the renunciation of natural rights in the state of nature—thereby constitutes the sovereign 
as the legitimate representative of the vanquished. Hence sovereignty, even when established 
under the most violent conditions, is necessarily legitimate, because the conditions of war that 
establish it are immediately replaced by the legitimacy of a representative political relation. War 
thus disappears from the fabric of the commonwealth, a faint memory with no bearing on the 
current order, a past experience without political significance. Sovereignty is thus constitutively 
legitimate and unchallenged. The Leviathan rules, necessarily, over a kingdom at peace. 
 Yet Foucault is not content with this construal of a pacific, and unchallenged, sovereignty, 
and he develops his critique of it in the form of an alternative conception of power. In fact, it is his 
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1973 critique of Hobbes that provides the first extended discussion of the “strategic model of 
power” which has since become a hallmark of his thought, and which framed both Discipline & 
Punish and The History of Sexuality, Volume 1.28 Central to this framework was the idea that war 
in some way provided the model for power relations more broadly. War was thus an “analyzer of 
power relations,”29 while the profusion of military metaphors in Foucault’s texts—tactics, 
strategies, forces, struggles—expressed this basic perspective. In the literature, this model is 
typically understood as an alternative to the sovereign or juridical model.30 Accordingly, it is seen 
to provide a way of thinking not sovereignty but, typically, discipline. I seek to argue instead that 
Foucault ultimately applies this model to sovereignty, too. Thus Foucault ultimately applies to 
sovereignty the general model which many commentators instead take to be his primary means of 
moving beyond sovereignty tout court. As I argue, it is this application that motivates him to find 
the classical model of sovereignty inadequate—even for the study of sovereignty itself. In the 
remainder of this section I show how Foucault’s adherence to the strategic model of power thus 
leads him to criticize Hobbes. In the following section, I illustrate in greater detail the ensuing 
strategic construal of sovereignty as it is employed in Discipline & Punish. 
 As mentioned above, Foucault’s primary object of criticism vis-à-vis Hobbes is the premise 
that sovereignty and war are conceptually incompatible. It is not difficult to see how the strategic 
model of power would challenge this premise. Consider, for example, Foucault’s early formulation 
of this model: “Civil war is the matrix of all struggles of power, of all strategies of power, and 
consequently it is also the matrix of all the struggles regarding and against power.” This 
formulation is taken to redress the longstanding propensity in political philosophy—whether that 
of Hobbes or others—to “disavow” civil war, or to consider it not constitutively relevant to the 
study of politics. In contrast, Foucault’s formulation alleges that war should rather provide the 
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“starting point” for the study of politics, and thus that war can be seen as an intelligible logic within 
the exercise of all forms of power.31 Accordingly, war is not an other to politics, but rather, the 
sphere in which it is constituted. The claim that civil war is the matrix for all strategies of power 
signals its extension to sovereignty. Contra Hobbes, then, the study of sovereignty must begin with 
a consideration of its implication in a logic of conflict. Sovereignty and war are not conceptually 
incompatible, but rather mutually necessary and inextricably entangled. 
 Accordingly, in his 1973 discussion of Hobbes, Foucault is foremost concerned with 
loosening the strict division between sovereignty and war, and in beginning to formulate a 
conception of their mutual necessity or co-constitution. In the following rejoinder to Hobbes, 
Foucault further elaborates: 
[C]ontrary to what political theory usually assumes, civil war is not prior to the constitution 
of power; no more than it is what necessarily marks its disappearance or weakening. Civil 
war is not a sort of antithesis of power, what exists before or reappears after it. Civil war 
and power are not mutually exclusive. Civil war takes place on the stage of power. There 
is civil war only in the element of constituted political power; it takes place in order to keep 
or conquer power, to confiscate or transform it.32 
 
This passage may be seen to take aim specifically at Hobbes’s contractarian view on the 
constitution of sovereignty. We have seen that, whether by institution or acquisition, sovereignty, 
for Hobbes, always marks the founding of a legitimate political order. The consent to be ruled by 
the Leviathan thus represents a disavowal of natural rights and a necessary suspension of war. 
Foucault’s war model instead posits that a kind of war may be seen to continue even after the 
moment of political inauguration. This is a war waged by the subjects of power, who attempt to 
conquer, confiscate, or transform it. But it is also a war waged by the constituted political power 
itself—by the sovereign, the state—in order to maintain power. That politics thus exists in the 
element of war signals its precariousness. Constituted power finds itself always in need of further 
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support in an ongoing civil war; its security is never guaranteed, its authority constantly 
challenged. 
 This early construal of Foucault’s strategic conception of power anticipates later 
formulations likewise relevant to his critique of Hobbes. In The History of Sexuality, Volume 1 
Foucault accordingly held that power was not definitively possessed, but was rather relational, 
mobile, reversible, and precarious. Power is not acquired as though it were a thing, but instead 
operates “as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, 
strengthens, or reverses [force relations].”33 Or, as he put it in “Society Must Be Defended”, 
“power is not something that is divided between those who have it and hold it exclusively, and 
those who do not have it and are subject to it. Power must … be analyzed as something that 
circulates.”34 It is clear that Foucault’s critique of Hobbes already applies such ideas to the study 
of sovereignty. Political power is not definitively possessed by the sovereign, or the state. Instead, 
it circulates ceaselessly through myriad struggles and confrontations. With the apparent cessation 
of war it does not come to rest in the body of a legitimate sovereign. It does not come to rest at all. 
Accordingly, Foucault’s strategic conception of power may be seen to strain the basic premise of 
Hobbes: that from the concept of sovereignty follows the cessation of war and the willful 
obedience of subjects.  
 While Foucault’s remarks on Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty are primarily critical, and 
while the alternative conception of power he proposes doesn’t extensively theorize sovereignty, it 
nonetheless has clear implications for how Foucault understands sovereign power, implications 
which will be illustrated in the following section. For now it will be enough to sketch a kind of 
anti-Hobbesian analytics of sovereignty that emerges by implication from these discussions.35 
According to this analytics, sovereignty is to be understood as traversed by social conflict to the 
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same extent as any other field of power relations. This conflict at the heart of sovereignty thus 
deprives it of the absoluteness traditionally attributed to it. It puts into radical question the authority 
of that power defined by Hobbes as the authority that cannot be put into question. Sovereignty is 
thus not a space of power defined by absolute rule and the elimination of war, but is instead 
characterized by conflict, contestation, and the reversibility of force relations. Foucault 
summarizes this basic disagreement in the following, definitive statement: “we have to reject the 
image Hobbes [proposed] in which, with the appearance of the exercise of sovereign [power], war 
is expelled from [the sovereign power’s] space.”36 In bringing war to bear on sovereign power, 
Foucault thus fundamentally reorients the political space of sovereignty, and relativizes its 
authority to all those forces aligned against it; in rejecting the Hobbesian division between politics 
and war, he humbles the absolutist pretensions of the Leviathan, bringing it down to the earthly 
struggles of a civil war. I shall now turn to Foucault’s employment and development of this anti-
Hobbesian analytics in Discipline & Punish. 
 
Sovereign Power in Discipline & Punish 
Prima facie, Discipline & Punish has little to do with sovereignty. As the title indicates, its primary 
interest is instead the disciplinary power that emerges in the nineteenth century. The discussion of 
sovereign torture therein appears merely to negatively index the novelty of this new modality of 
power. Accordingly, the reception of this text typically held that it was Foucault’s theorization of 
discipline—and not sovereignty—that marked its contribution to political thought (whether this 
contribution was welcome or not). I wish to argue not that Discipline & Punish has something to 
do with sovereignty—this itself is indicated rather obviously by the lengthy examination of torture, 
the entire chapter (and more) dedicated to the genealogical exposition of this paradigmatic 
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expression of sovereign power. Instead I seek to argue more precisely that it is the war model 
elaborated above that provides the theoretical framing for this exposition. Accordingly, the text 
may be read as a genealogical illustration of Foucault’s conflictual construal of sovereignty. By 
thusly reading Discipline & Punish, I shall draw attention to the sui generis account of sovereign 
power thus far overlooked in the literature. Yet this text doesn’t only illustrate the model of power 
theorized elsewhere in Foucault’s oeuvre. It also draws attention to one more feature of 
sovereignty, not yet considered: that its violence is foremost deployed when sovereign authority is 
challenged. As will be shown, for Foucault, sovereign violence operates as the forceful and often 
theatrical restoration of an authority put under question. 
 Read with the strategic conception of power in mind, what is immediately striking about 
Discipline & Punish is its apparent commitment to the anti-Hobbesian idea of an imbrication of 
sovereignty and civil war.37 This commitment comes out most clearly in Foucault’s discussion of 
the status of law and crime vis-à-vis sovereign power. Recall that Foucault largely upholds the 
traditional view on the predominantly legal nature of sovereign power. This view entails not only 
that law and sovereign are identical, but further, that law discursively represents the will of the 
sovereign.38 Sovereign power functions not only through the instrumentalization of prohibitory 
law, but also through a discourse of power which postulates its equivalence with sovereignty. 
Accordingly, the transgression of law, while an injury to the kingdom, must also be construed as 
an attack on the sovereign himself. Thus every crime, no matter its apparent victim or relative 
gravity, must be construed as undermining sovereign authority. Crime cannot be interpreted as 
mere infraction, under the sovereign mechanics of power. Instead, it bears an immediately political 
character. As Foucault summarizes, “In every offense was a crimen majestatis and in the least 
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criminal a potential regicide.”39 That sovereignty functions foremost through mechanisms of law 
entails that an attack on the latter is no less than an attack on the former. 
 If crime is thus irreducibly political, then the criminal cannot be conceived merely as an 
errant citizen or individual. Instead, the criminal, in attacking the sovereign, becomes an enemy; 
his infraction is seen as an act of war. To the sovereign, “disobedience was an act of hostility, the 
first sign of rebellion, which is not in principle different from civil war.”40 Thus we see in 
Discipline & Punish Foucault’s employment of civil war as a matrix for the relations between law, 
illegality, and sovereignty. Recall that, according to this matrix, “Civil war is not a sort of antithesis 
of power, what exists before or reappears after it.… Civil war takes place on the stage of power.”41 
Here this entails that the constituted sovereign power is always pursued by civil war, while the 
paradigmatic form of civil war is conflict over the law. Criminality becomes the belligerent act 
par excellence. Every crime represents a weakening of power, a minute shift in the balance of 
forces, a momentary “eclipse” of sovereign authority. In a context of constant civil war, law 
becomes the banner which must stand if sovereignty is not to fall.42  
 Hence, in Discipline & Punish, sovereign power is situated foremost in the context of civil 
war. It is found to be always under threat or siege, while its equation with and dependence on law 
renders it vulnerable to a constant barrage of transgressions which, to a greater or lesser extent, 
weaken its foundations, its symbolic monopoly on legitimate coercion, its absoluteness. The 
sovereignty figured in Discipline & Punish is not that of the Leviathan, ruling over a kingdom at 
peace; the legitimacy of the Prince does not go unchallenged. Accordingly, the text may be seen 
to genealogically illustrate the conflictual construal of sovereignty canvassed above. It applies 
Foucault’s strategic conception of power not just to discipline, but further, to the technology of 
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power that discipline succeeds. Power, whether disciplinary or sovereign, is thus here construed 
on a model of war. 
 Yet the most striking feature of Foucault’s discussion of sovereignty is its meticulous 
analysis of public torture. This analysis brings us to a final feature of sovereignty, namely, the 
conditions under which it deploys violence, along with its mode of deployment. In Discipline & 
Punish, Foucault explicitly links this deployment to attempts to restore sovereign authority in 
moments of its waning. If crime is seen as an attack on the sovereign, then sovereign violence will 
seek to restore the authority of the sovereign thereby compromised. Put differently, violence is 
marshalled in moments in which the sovereign’s capacity to command obedience wanes. It is thus 
deployed when the law of the sovereign is threatened, and it seeks to reassert the sovereign’s legal 
authority, its capacity to command obedience to its law. Accordingly, sovereign violence—and its 
quintessential form, public torture—is not to be viewed as the expression of absolute power. It 
does not manifest the monarch at his most powerful. In fact, the opposite. In Arendtian terms, one 
may say that violence is instead deployed when sovereignty finds itself at its most powerless.43 It 
is deployed when its primary standard of power, law, loses its authority, when its commands no 
longer secure immediate obedience. Hence sovereign violence is an instrumental tactic for the 
shoring up of a sovereignty under eclipse. Sovereignty’s authority must be reactivated and restored 
because, in a state of war, this authority has markedly waned. The precariousness of sovereignty 
is the occasion for the ferocity of its violence. 
 If the conditions for the deployment of sovereign violence are found in threats to sovereign 
authority, its mode of deployment will be essentially performative: from a state of powerlessness, 
sovereignty must perform its power. Accordingly, the public execution, for example, entails more 
than a legal function. It achieves more than the mere judicial punishment of an individual’s 
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infraction. It further fulfils a political function, through the performance and symbolic restoration 
of an authority temporarily lost. Recall that above, law was considered not only the instrument of 
sovereignty, but also its “mode of manifestation.” The manifestation of law coded the legitimacy 
and power of the sovereign. Accordingly, it is in manifestations—foremost in public, ritualized 
displays of royal justice—that the absoluteness of sovereignty is made tangible. Such ritualized 
displays become a central means for the maintenance of a sovereign power always under siege. In 
more traditionally Foucauldian terms, we may say that sovereign violence is always accompanied 
by a form of power-knowledge, by a kind of legitimating discourse. This violence is not “silent,” 
it does not consist solely in force.44 Instead, it is constitutively tied to a discourse on the legitimacy, 
and might, of the sovereign himself. (And so as with the strategic conception of power, we now 
see another extension of a famous Foucauldian insight—here, the co-constitution of power and 
knowledge—to the analysis of sovereignty.)  
 Foucault’s strategic construal of sovereignty and sovereign violence, along with their 
fundamentally performative dimension, is expressed in the following passage, quoted at length: 
The public execution, then, has a juridico-political function. It is a ceremonial by which a 
momentarily injured sovereignty is reconstituted. It restores that sovereignty by 
manifesting it at its most spectacular. The public execution … belongs to a whole series of 
great rituals in which power is eclipsed and restored…; over and above the crime that has 
placed the sovereign in contempt, it deploys before all eyes an invincible force. Its aim is 
not so much to re-establish a balance as to bring into play, as its extreme point, the 
dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful 
sovereign who displays his strength.… In this liturgy of punishment, there must be an 
emphatic affirmation of power and of its intrinsic superiority…. The public execution did 
not re-establish justice; it reactivated power.45  
 
This passage encapsulates the chief points of Foucault’s account of sovereignty: (1) that 
sovereignty is not absolute, but rather contested and precarious, best understood on a model of 
war; (2) that on this model, crime itself represents a political injury to the authority of the 
sovereign; (3) that sovereign violence is the strategic response to the loss or waning of this 
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authority; and (4) that sovereign violence is performative and seeks to restore and reactivate power. 
It is perhaps this final point that best underscores the first. For the very need to repeatedly perform 
its power indicates the deficit of this power in the first place, or else the constant challenges to 
which it must respond. Thus the very ritualization of public execution—and its existence alongside 
numerous other “great rituals in which power is eclipsed and restored”—indicates the regularity 
with which this spectacularized sovereign power is called upon, as necessary to forestall the fall 
of the king. In an unceasing battle, constant, visible reminders of the latter’s might are imperative. 
But this necessity reveals the constitutive weakness of sovereignty. It is permanently precarious, 
its guarantee of the law tenuous and contested. The performative character of sovereign violence 
thus underscores its fragility, and that it rests merely on the shaky foundation of iterated 
manifestations of power. Sovereignty, for Foucault, is thus ultimately an absoluteness without 
absolute power, or an absoluteness whose absoluteness is always contested and must always be 
restored, resignified and manifested. The long historical waning of sovereignty through modernity 
occurs alongside its quotidian ebb and flow. 
 
Absolutist and Popular Sovereignties 
If Foucault is right, then sovereign violence foremost responds to threats to sovereign power. 
Sovereignty itself would then be construed as constitutively precarious and beset by near constant 
war. Such a construal accords with historical record. The early modern state formed in the midst 
of violent religious, political, and social conflict. The specific political arrangements of 
sovereignty thus emerged through the monarch’s conflict with religious dissenters, antagonistic 
parliaments, and restive peasants and bourgeois alike. (The relative weight of each depending on 
specific national context.) While the absolutist state was the consequence of these conflicts, 
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historical scholarship has long cast doubt on the extent to which this state was actually absolute.46 
From a Foucauldian standpoint, then, classical theories of sovereignty would be viewed as 
aspirational projects for the absoluteness of a sovereignty that remained out of reach. These 
theories sought normative justification for the only kind of rule their authors imagined could 
definitively end all conflict, yet unlike Foucault’s descriptive theory, they fell analytically short of 
power as it was actually exercised. By challenging in particular the “nostalgic” Hobbesian theory, 
Foucault proposed an account much closer to actual historical fact. This account certainly drew 
from Hobbes—the construal of sovereignty as a constitutively legal power remains faithful to the 
former. Yet it humbled Hobbes’ account, too, in claiming that the Leviathan is not an exit from 
war, but its continuation by other means. 
 With his account of sovereignty, however, Foucault aims not only at historical aptness, but 
also contemporary relevance. This account is intended to describe not just the way sovereignty 
functioned in the 17th century, but also its contemporary mode of operation. Yet the success of 
such an intent is immediately rendered doubtful when one considers the fact that Foucault’s 
comments on sovereignty are mostly limited to the consideration of absolutist sovereignty, at the 
expense of any sustained engagement with a distinctly popular form or theory of sovereignty. 
Indeed, in Discipline & Punish, the primary rhetorical function of the analysis of sovereignty lies 
in the generation of a contrast between an “old” technology of power—here typified in the 
medieval ritual of public torture ordered by the monarch—and a new technology that at least partly 
displaces it. Hence while Foucault elucidates a shift in the dominant mode of punishment, so he 
largely ignores a contemporaneous transformation in the form of sovereignty, as numerous 
monarchies across Europe were gradually replaced by more representative or democratic regimes. 
To these latter regimes, which claim to represent the will of the people and not that of the 
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sovereign, popular sovereignty appears a more appropriate concept than its absolutist predecessor. 
Yet Foucault’s comments on sovereignty focus stubbornly on the rule of the king. 
 If perhaps stubborn, this focus is also intentional. Foucault is not unaware of the passage 
to popular sovereignty, and this is made evident in a few highly condensed passages across his 
oeuvre in which he addresses it directly. Accordingly, I wish to claim that the distinction between 
absolutist and popular sovereignty for Foucault remains more apparent than real, and that the 
changes inaugurated by the latter are less significant than its continuities with the former. In what 
follows, I shall return to the two features of the classical theory of sovereignty that Foucault 
endorsed and considered definitive for the functioning of sovereignty as a mode of power: its 
instrumentalization of law and its discursive character. I shall briefly explain how Foucault tracks 
each feature across popular sovereignty, too, and why he finds these continuities more analytically 
significant than the discontinuities. 
 Beginning with sovereignty’s juridical character: Foucault’s brief acknowledgements of 
popular sovereignty typically appear in those broader discussions that appeal to a contrast 
between sovereignty simpliciter and other technologies of power, for example, discipline and 
government.47 In such discussions, the contrast is often specifically intended to highlight the 
non-juridical nature of the latter. There, Foucault seems to suggest that more important than an 
apparent transfer of sovereignty from monarch to body of the people is the continuous operation 
of sovereignty, however construed, as an essentially juridical and prohibitory power. If the real 
innovation lies in non-juridical modes of power, then we may infer that the juridical basis of 
popular sovereignty keeps it in fundamental proximity to absolutist sovereignty. Foucault 
suggests as much in a 1978 lecture, in which he considers Hobbes and Rousseau (the latter being 
a central figure in the development of the theory of popular sovereignty) in the same theoretical 
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camp vis-à-vis theories of government. For both thinkers, Foucault claims, “the sovereign is the 
person who can say no to any individual’s desire”; the difference between the two lies only in 
competing strategies for “how to legitimatize this ‘no’ opposed to individuals’ desire and found 
it on the will of these same individuals.”48 This characterization of the commonality between 
Hobbes and Rousseau remains undeveloped in Foucault. Nonetheless, it hints at arguments made 
by other anti-sovereign thinkers, such as Hannah Arendt, according to whom attempts to 
represent the will of the people in a sovereign form lead inevitably to the construction of a 
unitary legislative power as arbitrary as that of monarchical sovereignty.49 Andrew Arato and 
Jean Cohen provide the following summary of Arendt’s position, which also tracks Foucault’s: 
“Sovereignty [absolutist and popular] is construed as the assertion of the will, as the ultimate 
discretion of an uncommanded commander who is legibus solutus—the source of law and so 
unbound by law—thus arbitrary, leveling, homogenizing, and solipsistic by definition.”50  
Foucault likewise contends that even an apparently democratized sovereignty remains formally 
continuous with Hobbes’s absolutist conception, insofar as it functions foremost through the 
imposition of prohibitory, imperative law.51 The representational content of sovereignty may 
change from will of the monarch to general will, but its basic, juridical mechanics remain the 
same. 
 Foucault’s discussions of the discursive character of popular sovereignty likewise lead to 
a view on the latter’s more basic continuity with absolutist sovereignty. Admittedly, Foucault 
tracks an important shift in this character with the passage to popular sovereignty. However, this 
shift does not result in sovereignty becoming representative of the general will. Instead, it further 
facilitates domination—now, primarily, the domination characteristic of disciplinary society. 
Accordingly, the new, discursive function of sovereignty “masks” or “conceals” modern 
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disciplinary power relations with its discourse of rights and liberties. Foucault thus contrasts the 
formal representation of a general will to the actual domination persistent in society: “although, 
in a formal way, the representative régime makes it possible … for the will of all to form the 
fundamental authority of sovereignty, the disciplines provide, at the base, a guarantee of the 
submission of forces and bodies.”52 This novel masking function undoubtedly indicates a real 
modification in the nature of sovereignty. With the advent of discipline, sovereignty adapts to 
better ensure its functioning. Here, sovereignty becomes articulated with discipline, a 
legitimating discourse that provides the semblance of representation while obscuring actual 
relations of domination. The discourse of sovereignty is thus no longer limited to the 
performance of the monarch’s authority, but instead expands to include the legitimation of 
modern society. 
 This novelty, however, should not obscure a more fundamental continuity. For Foucault, 
the democratic and egalitarian ideals that correspond to the discourse of popular sovereignty are 
persistently undercut by the actual functioning of discipline; the constitution of the general will 
remains merely “formal.” The “people” remains a fiction—and thus here, too, Foucault departs 
from Hobbes, for whom the covenant transforms the disparate multitude into the “distinct moral 
person” of a unified “state.”53 Hence the discourse of popular sovereignty here obscures the 
continuation of social disunity and conflict. Or rather, it obscures the ongoing civil war in which 
it is itself a partisan instrument. We may thus be justified in viewing the discursive development 
of sovereignty as a novel “tactic” in a civil war whose terrain shifts historically. The civil war in 
which classical absolutist sovereignty functions is not, for example, interrupted in 1789 (or 1649 
for that matter) but rather develops on a further political plane. Moreover, Foucault repeatedly 
emphasizes the persistence of challenges to discipline, the pervasive “counter-powers” that 
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render obedience far from guaranteed.54 Such challenges are further evidence of the ongoing 
civil war in which the modern discourse of sovereignty must intervene. Sovereignty thus remains 
a discourse—if a quite mutable one—in conditions of conflict wherein power relations are 
unstable and reversible, and authority is constantly contested. 
 Elucidating Foucault’s view that sovereignty, whether absolutist or popular, is a mutable 
discourse helps to further underscore his distance from Hobbes. It demonstrates that, contra 
Hobbes and much Western political thought, sovereignty is not a fact, a state of affairs, or a 
condition in which a political authority either finds itself or not. Instead, Foucault views 
sovereignty as a claim. Sovereignty is not the fact of irresistible power, but instead a discourse 
that performs an authority which must be obeyed, or an articulated set of rights and obligations 
to which one must conform. In fact it is precisely this line of thought which historian F. H. 
Hinsley expresses as follows: “Men do not wield or submit to sovereignty. They wield or submit 
to authority or power…. [S]overeignty is not a fact. It is a concept which men in certain 
circumstances have applied—a quality they have attributed or a claim they have counterposed—
to the political power which they or other men were exercising.”55 Hinsley’s formulation, which 
anticipates Foucault’s own, helps to further deflate the aspirations of the classical theory of 
sovereignty, by contrasting authority to political concepts, and placing sovereignty definitively in 
the latter category. Contra Hobbes, then, sovereignty is not a fact inaugurated by way of the 
social contract; instead it is a concept which must be applied, or else a discourse which must be 
repeatedly circulated and performed. Above I underscored the relational character of 
sovereignty, according to Foucault—sovereignty’s status as mobile social relation, as opposed to 
static thing. Here we might further emphasize its mutability and adaptability, its status as a 
flexible discourse of power which does not disappear with the passage to representative 
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democracy, but only changes form. And surely the persistence of discourses of sovereignty 
today, in our apparently post-sovereign age, further testifies to its flexibility and tenacity. 
 
Conclusion 
The intent of this article has been to sketch the contours of the sui generis account of sovereignty 
found in Foucault. I thus challenged the common views that either (1) Foucault believes 
sovereignty to be wholly irrelevant to a typology of modern technologies of power, or (2) his views 
on sovereignty are not unique, and instead borrowed more or less wholesale from the classical 
theory. While Foucault certainly upholds the classical emphasis on law, so he also views 
sovereignty through a framework of civil war, in which the founding of sovereignty is not the 
cessation of war, but its continuation by other means. Accordingly, sovereignty is fundamentally 
precarious, beset by conflict and crisis; it falls far short of the absoluteness ascribed to it whether 
by Hobbes or Bodin or any other classical theorist. I also considered Foucault’s views on popular 
sovereignty, and concluded that the latter maintains significant continuities with its absolutist 
predecessor. From a Foucauldian view, of course, any contemporary account of politics will need 
to acknowledge disciplinary, biopolitical, and governmental logics of power. Yet this article has 
advocated the addition of a distinctly Foucauldian construal of sovereignty to the list. Such a 
sovereignty is besieged and contested, but also spectacular, a technology of power adaptable and 
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